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BID SHOPPING RESTRICTIONS HELD IN
RESTRAINT OF TRADE
People v. Inland Bid Depository
233 Cal. App. 2d 851, 44 Cal. Rptr. 206 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965)
The State of California brought this action to enjoin alleged violations
of California's antitrust laws. The defendant Inland Bid Depository, herein-
after referred to as IBD, processed and delivered subcontractors' bids to
general contractors in the building-trades industry. This bid depository
scheme was designed to protect subcontractors from bid shopping: the
technique of disclosing one subcontractor's bid to another subcontractor
before the award of the prime contract in an attempt by a general contractor
to get a still lower bid. About 90 per cent of the projects processed through
IBD were public projects. IBD's members comprised a majority of the sub-
contractors in sixteen trades in Riverside and San Bernardino counties, and
during the years 1959-60 processed a majority of the total volume of public
projects. Under the revised rules of IBD as approved by the trial court, any
general contractor who agreed to receive two or more bids submitted through
IBD in any trade on any project was bound to accept the lowest bid so
received.1 Any general contractor was permitted to use IBD if it agreed to
follow the rules, and a nonmember subcontractor was permitted to use IBD
if it agreed to follow the rules applicable to member subcontractors. Member
subcontractors and nonmember subcontractors using IBD could not submit
bids to general contractors not using IBD on a particular project. General
contractors using IBD could not receive bids from subcontractors not using
IBD on a particular project. Bids had to be submitted no later than three
business hours before the prime bid opening time. Under the original IBD
rules any bid could be rejected if the subcontractor would not furnish a bond
upon request. Bids could be withdrawn only from all general contractors
1 Section 8(B) of the approved revised rules provided in part:
If the general contractor elects to receive none of the bids or only one bid
on any particular craft or trade, he is free to obtain or receive bids from any
member or nonmember subcontractor, whether or not they deposited a bid for
him with IBD .... If a general contractor elects to receive delivery through
IBD of two or more bids for a trade or craft, he shall be obligated, and he
hereby agrees, that if he is the successful prime bidder and receives an award of
the general contract, he will award the contract for this particular trade or craft
to the lowest bidder whose bid he received through IBD. As used in these rules,
"received through IBD" shall include, for this purpose, bids delivered by a sub-
contractor direct to the general contractor when executed duplicate originals
thereof were deposited with IBD by the subcontractor... . regardless of whether
the general contractor received the same from IBD ....
People v. Inland Bid Depository, 233 Cal. App. 2d 851, 861 n.2, 44 Cal. Rptr. 206, 212 n.2
(Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
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using IBD and upon payment of a fine. The rules of IBD2 were enforced by
fining, suspending or expelling its members.3
The trial court found that the operations of IBD brought about only de
muinis increases in building costs, and did not adversely affect or coerce the
construction industry. The trial court also found that IBD operated in good
faith and never engaged in collusion or unfair practices. 4 Nevertheless, the
trial court held in a memorandum opinion that those rules of IBD which
prevented those subcontractors and general contractors using IBD from
dealing with subcontractors and general contractors not using IBD on a
given project constituted a group boycott and a tampering with pricing prac-
tices in violation of the California antitrust statutes. 5 An injunction was
issued which restrained IBD from preventing subcontractors and general
contractors from dealing with one another four hours or more prior to the
time set by the awarding authority for the receipt of bids.6 The effect of the
2 Although such would certainly seem to be the case, the opinion does not clearly
indicate whether the bonding of subcontractors, withdrawing of bids, and fining-of-
member clauses of earlier rules of IBD were retained in the approved revised rules of IBD.
3 Presumably nonmember subcontractors using IBD also agreed to be bound by the
fining provisions applicable to members. Possibly the only difference between nonmember
and member subcontractors was that membership extended over many projects. However,
such a distinction would have been of little significance, since apparently member sub-
contractors were allowed to withdraw from membership and act as nonmembers on
future projects.
4 The findings of the trial court are summarized in the appellate court's opinion.
People v. Inland Bid Depository, supra note 1, at 854-55, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 208-09.
5 The specific portions of the California Business and Professions Code held violated
read as follows:
§ 16720. Trusts. A trust is a combination of capital, skill or acts by two or
more persons for any of the following purposes:
(a) To create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce....
(e) To make or enter into or execute or carry out any contracts, obligations
or agreements of any kind or description, by which they do all of any or any
combination of any of the following:
(4) Agree to pool, combine or directly or indirectly unite any interests
that they may have connected with the sale or transportation of any such article
or commodity, that its price might in any manner be affected.
§ 16726. Trusts against public policy. Except as provided in this chapter,
every trust is unlawful, against public policy and void.
Id. at 852, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 207.
6 The injunction specifically restrained IBD from operating a bid depository which
in any manner did any of the following four hours or more prior to the time set by the
awarding authority for receipt of bids on any construction project: (1) limit any sub-
contractor from submitting a bid to a general contractor or awarding authority, (2)
restrict the amount of a bid submitted by a subcontractor, (3) prevent a general con-
tractor or awarding authority from receiving or considering, any bid. These provisions
of the injunction of the trial court are reprinted in the appellate court's opinion. Id. at
857, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
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injunction was to permit an opportunity for bid shopping before the four
hour period, but to allow the full operation of the approved revised rules of
IBD which ended bid shopping during the last hours7 before the award of
the contract. On the appeal, only the remedy was attacked; the findings of
fact and conclusions of law were not questioned. The appellate court ordered
that the four-hours-or-more clause be deleted from the injunction and that
IBD be permitted to submit new rules in conformity with the injunction,
"to the end that open competition is available to all bidders, whether a mem-
ber or not of IBD." s
Although this action was based upon the California antitrust statutes,
the state appellate court's analysis was based upon federal cases interpreting
the Sherman Act.9 This was a proper approach in view of the prior Califor-
nia cases, the similar language of the acts, and the broader federal
experience.' 0 Just as in trade association cases under the Sherman Act,1 no
special rules have been established to determine the legality of bid depositories.
Both California's antitrust act and the Sherman Act purport on their faces
to be absolute prohibitions. Yet, as demonstrated by Holmes' atomization
theory, a rule against all trade restraints is even a theoretical impossibility,
since even ordinary contracts in effect restrict trade.' 2 Therefore a rule of
reason was adopted to determine which restraints were illegal.' 3 Just as in the
7 The approved revised rules set the time for submission of bids by subcontractors
at least three hours before the contract awarding time. Thus, subcontractors had one
hour in which they could submit bids to IBD without the bids being shopped under
cover of the injunction. Earlier rules of IBD had provided for a four hour period, but
the reduction to three hours allowed any subcontractor to avoid the effect of the injunction
if he desired.
8 People v. Inland Bid Depository, supra note 1, at 864, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
9 26 Stat. 209-10 (190), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1964). Section 1 thereof provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal. ....
10 See von Kalinowski & Hanson, "The California Antitrust Laws: A Comparison
with the Federal Antitrust Laws," 6 U.CL.AL. Rev. 533 (1959). (von Kalinowski was
an attorney for IBD in the instant case.)
11 Oppenheim, Cases on Federal Antitrust Laws 180 (2d ed. 1959), states:
[The principles governing the antitrust significance of trade association activities]
are: first, that normal trade association activities are not illegal in themselves,
but they become so only when used to accomplish an end that violates the anti-
trust laws; and, second, that it is frequently not one activity, but a combination
which leads to antitrust difficulties.
12 Bork, "The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division," 74 Yale LJ. 775, 813-14 (1965).
13 Standard OQi Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The Court stated:
Thus not specifying but indubitably contemplating and requiring a standard,
it follows that it was intended that the standard of reason which had been ap-
plied at the common law in this country in dealing with subjects of the character
embraced by the [Sherman Act] . . . was intended to be the measure used for
the purpose of determining whether in a given case a particular act d or hW
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Sherman Act, there is an implied exemption in the California antitrust act
for reasonable restraints.14 However, there are certain areas of antitrust
activity which are so flagrant as to be characterized as per se unreasonable
and thus illegal. Price fixing' 5 and group boycotts' 6 have been held per se
violations. Since bid depository schemes have not been held inherently
violative of the antitrust laws,17 it is necessary to examine the purpose and
effect of each bid depository plan to discover the possible presence of price
fixing or group boycott.
A purpose to restrain trade may lead to a violation of the Sherman AcL
18
Further, any effective restraint must be directed toward a legitimate purpose
to be held permissible.19 Applying this test to a bid depository plan in United
not brought about the wrong against which the statute provided.
Id. at 60.
14 Associated Plumbing Contractors v. F. W. Spencer & Son, Inc., 213 Cal. App. 2d 1,
8, 28 Cal. Rptr. 425, 429 (1963); People v. Building Maintenance Contractors' Ass'n, 41
Cal. 2d 719, 725, 264 P.2d 31, 36 (1953) ; von Kalinowski & Hanson, supra note 10, at 541.
Is In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), the Court stated
at 218: "Thus for over forty years this Court has consistently and without deviation ad-
hered to the principle that price-fixing agreements are unlawful per se under the Sherman
Act and that no showing of so-called competitive abuses or evils which these agreements
were designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a defense."
16 Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211-12 (1959).
17 But see Christiansen v. Mechanical Contractors Bid Depository, 230 F. Supp. 186
(D. Utah 1964), wherein the district court suggested that the enforcement of a rule which
prevented general contractors from using subbids which were not received from the de-
fendant bid depository may constitute a per se violation. On appeal, however, the court
expressly stated that it did not need to determine whether this provision alone was a per
se violation, since it affirmed the district court's holding that the combined effect of this
rule with the defendant's rules regulating bid splitting and rebidding violated section 1 and
section 2 (attempt to monopolize) of the Sherman Act. Mechanical Contractors Bid De-
pository v. Christiansen, 352 F.2d 817, 819 n.5 (10th Cir. 1965). The rule prohibiting bid
splitting, later rescinded, virtually eliminated specializing subcontractors from the bid
depository system by requiring subcontractors to submit a single bid for work in many
trades. Id. at 819. The rebidding rule prevented subcontractors who had not originally
submitted bids on a particular project through the bid depository from participating in
any rebidding on that project during the 90-day period following the original bidding,
although those subcontractors who had used the bid depository on that project were not
so restricted. Ibid. The court pointed out that the bid depository questioned in Christiansen
was not only used to eliminate harmful bidding practices, but was also used to obtain
control over bidding practices and general contractor-mechanical contractor relations in
Utah. Ibid. The per se aspect of the district court's opinion was cited in the instant case.
However, the appellate court's decision in Christiansen was not reported until after the
decision in the instant case.
18 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 US. 106, 181-82 (1911).
19 This theory of ancillarity, pronounced by Judge Taft (later Chief justice of the
United States) in one of the first actions brought under the Sherman Act, holds that "the
main purpose of the contract suggests the measure of protection needed, and furnishes a
sufficiently uniform standard by which validity of such restraints may be judicially deter-
mined." United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898).
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States v. San Francisco Electrical Contractors Ass'n,2 0 it was held that the
purpose of maintaining compliance with certain bidding standards was not
in itself a violation of the Sherman Act. Protecting subcontractors from the
disclosure of their bids to other subcontractors in an attempt to get a still
lower bid would seem to be a permissible objective in California, since this
solicitation of a lower bid is specifically prohibited at any time after the
award of the prime contract on a public project.21 However, an analysis of the
federal bid depository cases revealed that bid depository schemes often
have been utilized illegally for the purpose of achieving these goals which
constitute specific antitrust violations: restraint of free price competition,
illegal coercion or boycott, market allocation, and improper participation of
third parties in business decisions.22 But these illegal purposes were not
specifically found to exist in the instant case.2 3
Another purpose constitutes a restraint of trade: the purpose to restrict
20 57 F. Supp. 57 (N.D. Cal. 1944).
21 This seems to represent the proper interpretation of California's Subletting and
Subcontracting Fair Practices Act, Cal. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 4100-13 (Supp. 1965). While
it does not appear from the language of this act that the California Legislature actually
did anything about shopping of subcontractors' bids before award of the prime contract, a
legislative declaration at § 4101 of the act states:
The legislature finds that the practices of bid shopping and bid peddling in
connection with the construction, alteration, and repair of public improvements
often result in poor quality of material and workmanship to the detriment of
the public, deprive the public of the full benefits of fair competition among
prime contractors and subcontractors, and lead to insolvencies, loss of wages
to employees, and other evils.
Although bid shopping is not defined in the act in question, if the legislature used the
term in its usual sense (see People v. Inland Bid Depository, supra note 1, at 863-64, 44
Cal. Rptr. at 214), the quoted section definitely controverts any possibility of a finding
of legislative intent in favor of bid shopping by negative implication. Further, the section
could be viewed as a legislative direction that the purpose of preventing bid shopping is a
legal and salutary one. It is interesting to note that the court did not seem to know about
the quoted section of the act, which was a 1963 amendment. See People v. Inland Bid
Depository, supra note 1, at 863, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 214, from which it is apparent that
the court cited the act as it appeared before amendment, since of the cited sections after
amendment, one is nonexistent and the other irrelevant to the point for which it is cited.
Thus, it appears that the court's determination that the result of bid shopping is lower
prices and a general benefit to the awarding authority is contrary to the legislative
declaration and to be given little weight. Ibid.
22 Schuelier, "Bid Depositories," 58 Mich. L. Rev. 497, 506-12 (1960). A table at
528-30 lists the federal bid depository cases with cross references to the improper practices
found therein.
23 Apparently the court did not find the purpose to eliminate bid shopping illegal,
since the court indicated it would approve other bid depository plans with that purpose.
People v. Inland Bid Depository, supra note 1, at 858, 863, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 211, 214.
Although there was found a group boycott and a tampering with pricing practices, it is
not indicated whether these violations resulted from the effect of IBD or from the illegal
purpose to bring about these violations.
1966]
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competition in the general market (all buyers and sellers of the same type
of product or service).24 Aside from its probable effect on competition and
production, the purpose to affect the general market is inconsistent with that
social and political goal of antitrust which attempts to prevent the concentra-
tion in private hands of economic power.25 Nevertheless, in Anderson v.
United States,2 6 the Court permitted a cattlemen's association to refrain from
dealing with nonmembers where the goal of the association was to improve
business integrity in the cattle exchange. In Fashion Originators' Guild of
America, Inc. v. FTC,27 however, the Supreme Court struck down an
eloborate system to boycott garment manufacturers who used textiles with
copied designs. Each of these cases may be reconciled in that the defendant in
Fashion Guild intended the destruction of a type of economic production,28
thereby narrowing the market,2 9 while in both the instant case and Anderson
the defendants attempted to improve the moral climate without affecting the
market. Thus, if an attempt to eliminate bid shopping is a legal purpose, and
if the court in the instant case did not find a purpose to violate the antitrust
statutes, then the decision must rest upon a finding of an effect of either a
restraint on the economy as a whole or a restraint on competition in the
industry.
24 United States v. joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 569 (1898). Bork, supra note
12, at 794.
25 Attly Gen. Natl Comm. Antitrust Rep. 1-2, 6 (1955). See United States v. Colum-
bia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948), where Mr. justice Douglas states in dissent at 536:
For all power tends to develop into a government in itself. Power that controls
the economy should be in the hands of elected representatives of the people, not
in the hands of an industrial oligarchy. Industrial power should be decentralized.
It should be scattered into many hands so that the fortunes of the people will
not be dependent on the whim or caprice, the political prejudices, the emo-
tional stability of a few self-appointed men. The fact that they are not vicious
men but respectable and social-minded is irrelevant. That is the philosophy and
the command of the Sherman Act....
See also Berghoff, "The Size Barrier in Merger Law-Or Antitrust by the Numbers," 27
Ohio St. LJ. 76 (1966), wherein the author finds that the Supreme Court has increasingly
emphasized concentration in invalidating mergers.
26 171 U.S. 604 (1898).
27 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
28 The Court found that "the aim of petitioners' combination was the intentional
destruction of one type of manufacturer and sale which competed with Guild members."
Id. at 467. The rules also prohibited manufacturers from selling at retail and selling at
regulated discounts. A trial-like system was adopted to enforce these provisions.
29 See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., supra note 16. In this case the
Court struck down a manufacturer's concerted refusal to deal with Klor's that was in-
duced by one of Kor's competitors. The Court stated at 213:
This combination takes from Klor's its freedom to buy appliances in an open
competitive market and drives it out of business as a dealer in the defendants'
products. It deprives the manufacturers and distributors of their freedom to sell
to Klor's at the same prices and conditions made available to Broadway-Hale,
and in some instances forbids them from selling to it on any terms whatsoever.
It interferes with the natural flow of interstate commerce.
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In addition to any political objective or the desire to increase competi-
tion within an industry, one of the primary purposes of the antitrust acts is
the prevention of restraint on the operation of the economy as a whole.30
The study of the effect of a transaction upon the economy as a whole is called
cmacroeconomics"; it is to be distinguished from an analysis of the effect
upon participants or upon a single industry. Chief Justice White's belief that
"furthering trade" 31 provided the test of legality under the Sherman Act, has
been viewed as requiring the application of economic standards to determine if
there is macroeconomic restraint 3 2 One authority carries this analysis fur-
ther to suggest that macroeconomic "wealth maximization" should be the
applicable test of restraint of trade.33 Economists generally suggest that the
promotion of competition, at which the antitrust laws are aimed,34 has these
macroeconomic values: guiding the flow of capital by supply and demand to
the most productive use, incentive for innovation and long run cost reduction,
equitable diffusion of real income among consumers and factors of production,
and aid to the government's anticyclical program through flexible prices.35
An evaluation of the characteristics of bid shopping, the practice sought
to be prevented by the bid depository plan, is necessary to determine whether
use of a bid depository is consistent with the macroeconomic goals indicated.
One commentator suggests these evils of bid shopping: it takes unfair
advantage of those subcontractors who have prepared bids, it leads to delay
in submitting bids in an attempt to avoid shopping, it discourages the sub-
mission of bids from fear, and it leads to early bid padding with a view to
later restrction.38 The economic effect of these evils is that it awards contracts
fortuitously or on the basis of arbitrary bidding technique, while it does not
select those subcontractors who possess the highest efficiency. A bid deposi-
tory attempts to modify the consequences of bid shopping by the regulation
of the selection system so as to help eliminate such deviations from the real
economic factors which make up the supply curve. As the awarding of sub-
contracts more closely approximates real economic conditions, business
stability is proportionately increased. 37 Stability tends to increase participa-
30 See, e.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940), where the Court says
at 493: "The end sought was the prevention of restraints to free competition in business
and commercial transactions which tended to restrict production, raise prices or otherwise
control the market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of good and services, all
of which had come to be regarded as a special form of public injury."
31 United States v. American Tobacco Co., supra note 18, at 179.
22 Bork, supra note 12, at 803-05.
33 Id. at 829-47.
34 Att'y. Gen. Natl Comm. Antitrust Rep. 1 (1955).
35 Id. at 317-18.
36 Schueller, supra note 22, at 499-500.
37 See Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925), where the
Court stated:
It is not, we think, open to question that the dissemination of pertinent
information concerning any trade or business tends to stabilize that trade or
business and to produce uniformity of price and trade practice. ... But the
natural effect of acquisition of wider and more scientific knowledge of business
1966]
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tion in bidding, especially by the more efficient subcontractors, since there is
a reduced risk of rejection from factors extraneous to production. The prepara-
tion of bids serves a useful purpose and represents a real cost worthy of
inclusion in the pricing and income distribution system. When bid shopping is
prevalent, a prospective bidder must consider the competitive advantage given
a subcontractor who elects not to incur the cost of an independent analysis
of the project. However, encouraging more subcontractors to undertake such
a study and offering a greater opportunity of selection to those who have found
a better production method would provide a strong incentive to innovation.
Where a bid depository merely acts as a neutral agent for processing bids,
it will not significantly affect the flexibility of the supply and demand curves,
and thus will not interfere with government anticyclical policy.3 8 In Associated
Plumbing Contractors v. F. W. Spencer & Sons, Inc.,39 it was found that the
bid depository involved promoted and stabilized business,40 and served the
public interest.41 If the effect of bid shopping is consistent with the macro-
economic goals of the antitrust laws, and if no purpose to restrain trade was
discovered, then the finding of illegality in the instant case must be based
upon a finding of an adverse effect upon competition in the particular in-
dustry involved or upon the participants.
The promotion of competition is the goal toward which the antitrust laws
are directly aimed, and thus an adverse effect upon competition may lead to
an illegal restraint of trade42 Where price fixing or a group boycott is
present, the anticompetitive effect is presumed. However, if the conduct in
question does not in fact amount to price fixing, although it may affect price
formation, it is then necessary to evaluate the significance of the effect upon
conditions, on the minds of the individuals engaged in commerce and its con-
sequent effect in stabilizing production and price, can hardly be deemed a
restraint of commerce or if so it cannot, we think, be said to be an unreasonable
restraint, or in any respect unlawful.
Id. at 582.
38 See Due, Government Finance 525-26 (3d ed. 1963).
39 Supra note 14, at 8, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
40 See Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936), wherein the Court
found this effect not necessarily improper, stating at 598: "Nor does the fact that the
correction of abuses may tend to stabilize a business, or to produce fairer price levels,
require that abuses should go uncorrected or that an effort to correct them should for
that reason alone be stamped as an unreasonable restraint of trade."
41 In Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, supra note 37, the Court said:
It is the consensus of opinion of economists and of many of the most im-
portant agencies of Government that the public interest is served by the gather-
ing and dissemination, in the widest possible manner, of information with respect
to the production and distribution, cost and prices in actual sales, of market
commodities, because the making available of such information tends to stabilize
trade and industry, to produce fairer price levels and to avoid the waste which
inevitably attends the unintelligent conduct of economic enterprise.
Id. at 582.
42 Att'y Gen. Nat'1 Comm. Antitrust Rep. 1 (1955).
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competition.43 In determining whether a restraint actually promotes com-
petition or adversely affects it, it is necessary to consider the nature of the
restraint, the practice it seeks to modify, its probable effect, and any alterna-
tive remedies that would be less restrictive.44
In evaluating the nature of the restraint that IBD may have imposed,
it must first be noted that any possible effect on prices was not direct; prices
were independently determined by a competitive process. Similarly, in Bd.
of Trade v. United States,45 the regulation in question required that all sales
of "grain-to-arrive" which occurred after the closing hours of the market
be at that price which was set by a competitive process at the end of each
market day. This rule was held to be reasonable because it established the
business hours of the grain exchange46 and also established a fair system
for determining the price of after-hours sale. The Court felt that a price set
by the competitive processes of the grain exchange would more likely be fair
and more closely reflect actual market conditions than would a price set
outside the grain exchange by private negotiations between dealers and
farmers.47 As pointed out by the dissent in the instant case, unequal bar-
43 In discussing conduct which may affect price formation, Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm.
Antitrust Rep. (1955) stated at 14:
Two difficult questions arise in these cases. First, does defendant's conduct
constitute price fixing in purpose or effect? Sometimes, as in simple price fixing
cases, the answer is easy. Often, however, where the character or effect of the con-
duct is equivocal, a broader view of the way the market functions is required
before a court can decide whether given behavior in fact amounts to price fixing.
The second question arises where price fixing is not found, but the practices
reviewed may affect price formation. Then its reasonableness or unreasonable-
ness turns on the relative significance of the competition eliminated as compared
with their other purposes or effects. A court's task is to determine (1) whether
defendants have enough market power to make the restriction on price an
"undue restraint" and (2) whether they currently exercise the power or intend
to do so.
See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., supra note 25, where in holding that a merger
did not violate the Sherman Act, the Court looked at the strength of the remaining
competition and other characteristics of the market.
44 Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). The Court established this
test:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is ap-
plied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of
the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the
evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose
or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Id. at 238.
45 246 US. 231 (1918).
46 Id. at 239.
47 Id. at 240-41. See also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., supra note
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gaining power is inherent in the subcontractor-general contractor relation
in which many parties must deal with one individual who may obtain a
given prime contract.48 This competitive situation differs from the ordinary
business transaction in that here, on any project, there will be only one
buyer of the services that many could provide. This case may be compared
with Chicago Board of Trade in that a reasonable organization of a market
prevented a competitive abuse and the award of a contract on the basis of
non-economic factors.
From congressional hearings on the use of bid shopping, one writer has
collected the possible advantages of allowing this practice to continue.49 They
include the possibility of subsequent clarification of the bid, additional time
to investigate particular subcontractors, negotiation in light of price alterna-
tives shown in the bids, and ability to modify the padded bids first sub-
mitted. However, the facts in the instant case may reduce the significance of
these factors. As to price alternatives, the rules of IBD required that each
project be divided into many separate trades, and permitted only the lowest
bid in each trade to be accepted. This reduced the likelihood that a sub-
contractor might be asked to perform only that part of his total estimate on
which his bid was lowest, since each subcontractor would be bidding on a
smaller quantity of work. However, the price alternative argument has some
validity since this provision of the rules affected neither price differences on
subdivisions within a trade, nor the offering to perform in one of various ways
at alternative prices. The ability to demand a bond and to a limited extent
the availability of standard contract remedies affords protection from non-
performing subcontractors. Further, the knowledge that their bids would not
be shopped would reduce the likelihood of subcontractors submitting padded
bids at first, with a view to later modification.
With regard to the probable anticompetitive effect of IBD, the appellate
court feared that requiring general contractors to accept the lowest bid at a
time when they may have seen no others, would lead to collusion through sub-
mission of equally overpriced bids by understanding or agreement among the
subcontractors.8 " However, by virtue of the trial court's injunction, no sub-
contractor or contractor could be prevented from submitting or considering
any bid four hours or more before the prime bid was due. 1 The provision of
this earlier period of unrestrained competition would permit bid shopping
15. This case indicated that price fixing was per se illegal at the time of the Board of
Trade case. However, it did not find that the rule in Board of Trade constituted price
fixing. The Court said that in Board of Trade, "No attempt was made to show that the
purpose or effect of the rule was to raise or depress prices. The rule affected only a small
proportion of the commerce in question. And among its effects was the creation of a
public market for grains under that special contract class, where prices were determined
competitively and openly." Id. at 217.
48 People v. Inland Bid Depository, sufra note 1, at 864-65, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
49 Schueller, supra note 22, at 504-05. See congressional hearings cited, ibid.
50 People v. Inland Bid Depository, supra note 1, at 859-60, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
51 Id. at 857, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
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during that time and might allow a general contractor to see other bids before
he was required to accept any bid. At least the knowledge of the possibility
of the receipt of such early bids would reduce the likelihood of collusion by
subcontractors. Yet, there would be no advantage for a subcontractor to
submit a bid to IBD during the injunction period; it would only be shopped.
Subcontractors know this, and thus would not significantly fear receipt of
earlier bids, making this a relatively ineffective sanction. In fact, no history
of collusion or unfair practices was found in the activities of IBD,52 but the
court's fear has some validity, although collusion was perhaps over-empha-
sized.
There are other bid depository schemes available to subcontractors
which reduce more effectively the possibility of collusion. The appellate court
distinguished the instant case from United States v. San Francisco Electrical
Contractors Ass'n53 by the "limited and restricted" bidding which the bid de-
pository in that case substituted for "unrestricted and unlimited bidding."54
This indicates that the appellate court was not adverse to the adoption of an
alternative bid depository plan. In that case the general contractors were
permitted to seek new subbids 90 days after the original bidding. Although
it was ordinarily not practical for this power to be used, it nonetheless
provided a greater deterrent to subcontractor collusion than the bid deposi-
tory scheme in the instant case, since the general contractors were not
permanently bound to accept a bid submitted through the bid depository, but
were free to reject all such bids that appeared to result from collusion. In
United States v. Bakersfield Associated Plumbing Contractors,5 the court
required the opening of bids to the public six hours before the time set for
the prime bid. This was unsatisfactory to IBD since it permitted bid shop-
ping at least from six hours before the prime bid dosing time till the dosing
time of the bid depository.
The appellate court emphasized that the public generally is the award-
ing authority when IBD is used. An assumption that the government would
not engage in the competitive abuse of bid shopping mitigates the charge
that a countervailing power is needed to prevent economic oppression by the
awarding authority. However, it does not follow that the general contractors
acting on public projects will likewise act with the same business integrity.
Another view is that the public interest in securing the best terms for itself
when it is the awarding authority is the paramount consideration, outweigh-
ing prejudices to subcontractors and the marginal effect upon macroeconomic
policy and long-run cost reduction. Thus we may have a double standard,
with the long-run public interest in permitting an adjustment of economic
bargaining power considered only in non-governmental contracts.
A bid depository is not per se illegal. The utilization of this device as
a means to eliminate bid shopping does not necessarily constitute price fixing
52 Id. at 855, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 209.
G3 57 F. Supp. 57 (N.D. Cal. 1944).
54 Id. at 66.
55 1959 Trade Cas. ff 69,266 at 75,035 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
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or a group boycott in purpose or effect. If properly used, it may bring about
a reasonable organization of a given market to eliminate a competitive abuse
of little value to the economy or to competition within the industry. However,
by virtue of a bid depository's operation in the area of price formation and
exclusion of nonconforming businessmen, it has a tendency to be abused, as,
for example, by the prior agreement of subcontractors to submit uniformly
overpriced bids. Perhaps it was this fear of abuse that prevented the Cali-
fornia legislature from outlawing bid shopping at the same time that it out-
lawed the solicitation of lower bids from subcontractors after the award of
the prime contract on public projects; however, another explanation might
be the reduced likelihood of a general contractor's passing on any savings to
the awarding authority after the prime contract was made. Nevertheless, in
the long run the elimination of bid shopping would help effectuate macro-
economic goals by the awarding of subcontracts to the more efficient sub-
contractors through the elimination of noneconomic aspects of the selection
system. It is not correct to say that the appellate court rejected all attempts
to balance economic power by the limitation of bid shopping. This court
merely rejected a specific plan which permitted bid shopping up till four
hours before the award of the prime contract; a plan which allowed the
operation of IBD's rules during the final hours to the effect of eliminating bid
shopping during that period. In light of a finding that it was precisely during
these last hours that most bidding took place, and in view of the availability
of alternative bid depository systems which afford a reduced opportunity of
subcontractor collusion, it would seem the decision of the appellate court is
proper. In addition, the trial court's unchallenged conclusion that the rules of
IBD constituted a group boycott and amounted to price fixing limited the
appellate court's ability to permit use of these very same rules for any period,
although they would be operating under changed circumstances brought about
by the earlier injunctive period.
